The Andexxa Showpiece

Every so often a masterclass performance arises in the medical literature. A performance transcending the boundaries of what was once thought possible. A shining exemplar of human achievement.

This is a trial, published in the New England Journal of Medicine, with the following features:

  • Conducted by an institute sponsored by pharma.
  • Designed by the first author, a consultant for pharma, and two employees of pharma.
  • Written by a medical writer employed by pharma.
  • Replete with authors reporting multiple financial conflicts of interest with pharma.
  • Substantially modified trial procedures and outcomes two and three years into the trial.
  • Introduced an interim stopping rule whose analysis was performed by an unblinded statistician affiliated with the funded institute.
  • Stopped the trial early based on the new interim stopping rule.
  • Used a surrogate composite primary endpoint.
  • Allowed the “usual care” arm to include patients who did not receive an active treatment comparator.
  • Permitted discrepancies in the baseline characteristics favoring the experimental arm.

And, this is solely the reported mechanisms by which pharma has placed their hands on the scales of this trial. It ought to be quite clear these procedures were carefully designed to ensure the (financial) success of this trial, and its ultimate publication is virtually an advertorial for the product in question.

The culprit this go-around? AstraZeneca née Alexion née Portola for Andexxa – better known as “andexanet alfa” (even though the FDA declined their drug naming for this label, properly known as “Coagulation Factor Xa [Recombinant], Inactivated-zhzo”). The trial is ANNEXA-I, which purports to be a comparison between Andexxa and Prothrombin Concentrate Complexes.

As alluded to above, this trial was not designed to permit Andexxa to fail. With Andexxa sales climbing and approaching $200M annually, it is obviously impermissible to allow a trial to offer a hint of doubt – especially considering Portola/Alexion/AstraZeneca have been investing in “expert guidelines” aimed at elevating Andexxa above PCCs as first-line treatment for Factor Xa-associated bleeding.

So – naturally, Andexxa “succeeds”. On the composite endpoint of “good hemostatic efficacy” – hematoma volume change < 35%, NIHSS change < 7 points, and no use of rescue therapy between 3-12 hours – Andexxa outperformed “usual care” by 13.4%, 67.0% to 53.1%. The primary limiting factor to this composite endpoint was the sub-endpoint of hematoma volume change of < 35%. And, as this composite favours Andexxa, the trial was stopped early – and the favorable press releases roll in. Ideally, this is the point at which our sponsors would like us to stop further analysis and critique.

Interestingly, the main paper presents an efficacy analysis consisting of 452 patients. However, between the initiation of the interim analysis and cessation of trial procedures, the authors enrolled an additional 78 patients. The authors report findings from all 530 in their safety analysis, but exclude them from the primary efficacy analysis – consigning the full cohort analysis to a supplementary appendix. There is no obvious reason to do so – other than the fact the larger cohort demonstrates less favorable results for Andexxa, with the hemostatic efficacy composite dropping from 67.0% to 63.9%. As is frequently cautioned regarding stopping trials early, doing so inflates the confidence intervals, diminishes the precision of an effect size estimate, and precludes the natural propensity of regression to the mean.

Then, there are the trial procedures. Prior to a protocol amendment excluding subdural hematomas, the Andexxa group included 13 patients with SDH, as compared with only 4 in “usual care”. Subdural hematomas, generally speaking, have far less sinister an outcome than intracerebral hemorrhage – an imbalance favoring the Andexxa cohort. Then, bizarrely, only 85% of the “usual care” cohort received anticoagulation reversal using PCCs. Very little data is included regarding these 60 patients receiving “non-PCC” care at the discretion of their treating clinicians. What sort of selection bias led clinicians to withhold an active treatment for ICH? Without concrete data, it is impossible to do more than speculate, but it seems logical to theorize these patients must have been disadvantaged by their lack of treatment.

Next, there are The Downsides. Treatment with Andexxa very clearly causes increased arterial thrombotic events. Ischemic strokes occurred in 6.5% of those treated with Andexxa, as compared to 1.5% receiving “usual care”. Myocardial infarctions occurred in 4.2% of those treated with Andexxa, as compared to 1.5% of those receiving “usual care”. A smaller excess of pulmonary embolism was seen in the “usual care” arm, however.

Lastly, there are the patient-oriented outcomes. Naturally, with a trial stopped early due to a composite surrogate, the authors are quick to mention the trial is underpowered to evaluate these endpoints. However, the overall outcomes of patients included in this trial are grim – and they are more grim for those treated with Andexxa. At 30 days, only 28% of patients treated with Andexxa achieved a modified Rankin scale of 0 to 3, compared with 31% in the “usual care” cohort. Similarly, 27.8% of patients treated with Andexxa had died at 30 days, as compared with 25.5% of those receiving “usual care”.

So, there you have it – such a “success” story of a trial it needed to be stopped early, and we still have no clear evidence Andexxa ought to be favored over “usual care”. The authors merrily cite INTERACT1, the trial upon which the “hematoma growth” surrogate is “validated” – and they will rely on this heavily for marketing purposes. In the end, we have exactly what we ought to have expected from a trial designed to stand on its head to deliver for its product, and we as clinicians are ever-poorer for it.

Andexanet for Factor Xa Inhibitor-Associated Acute Intracerebral Hemorrhage

Update to Start 2024

A brief post collating a few bits of my various work published across the interwebs ….

The Annals of Emergency Medicine Podcast continues to summarise the meatiest articles from each month, featuring a cycle of new co-hosts, as well:

Naturally, there are continuing Journal Club features, covering the following articles:

I should also point out a couple additional new publications with two very different and amazing teams:

Lastly, in ACEPNow, we have:

Enjoy!

Winter Recap

Spring is here down in this nuclear-free hemisphere. This blog is still effectively in stasis – but the productivity continues elsewhere!

Don’t forget the Annals of Emergency Medicine Podcast, a lighthearted feel-good romantic comedy with Rory Spiegel, available for free on your choice of streaming platforms:

Bimonthly #FOAMed in ACEPNow:

And, lastly, everyone’s favorite part of their residency curriculum, the Annals of Emergency Medicine Journal Club – in which we update folks from the wider world of medical literature in concise summaries for emergency medicine practice:

Enjoy!

TXA, The Miracle Drug With Mostly Negative Trials

Tranexamic acid is a lovely drug, and, as I always say, it’s virtually prototypical for the “floor wax AND a dessert topping” class of medications. Life-threatening bleeding AND skin whitening.

With all the hype, you’d expect it to have serious chops with respect to mitigating death – but it doesn’t. CRASH-2 led the use of TXA into prime time with a 1.5% absolute risk reduction in mortality when given to major trauma in a timely fashion. However, other such famed trials as WOMAN and CRASH-3 missed their primary endpoints – and we rely on their overall favorable “trends” and subgroup analyses to support current practice.

This, again, is no different – with its own twists and turns.

In this trial, patients were enrolled prehospital with suspected moderate or severe traumatic brain injury. This protocol is based on the very reasonable hypothesis “sooner is better” when the consideration is potential hematoma expansion into a closed space such as the calvarium. Patients received either a bolus of TXA, a half-bolus and half-infusion, and/or matching placebo to maintain the blinding. The primary outcome was favorable neurologic function at 6 months.

The trial enrolled and treated 966 participants with head injury, about three-fifths of whom ultimately demonstrated intracranial hemorrhage on advanced imaging. Consequently, a similar proportion had GCS ≤10, and many had polytrauma with a median injury severity score of 17. No obvious differences between groups at baseline should be expected to dramatically bias the true point estimate within the confidence interval.

And, the results are grossly unremarkable, to say the least. The authors take a bit of an interesting approach to presenting their negative result by explicitly stating their non-significant p-value of 0.16 for benefit alongside their non-significant p-value of 0.84 for harm. These are frequentist results, of course, and the p-value for benefit describes an adjusted effect size confidence interval between -0.9% and 10.2% with a 95% likelihood of containing the true point estimate of mortality benefit to TXA. The opposing p-value is a one-sided estimate of describing the likelihood (or lack thereof) the TXA is actually responsible for harm. Similar non-significant trends are seen with 28-day mortality and progression of intracranial hemorrhage, showing similar 95% CIs are a true point estimate more likely to favor TXA. Suffice to say, the TXA is providing benefit than harm, but these data are not profoundly conclusive.

So, again, this trial joins the parade of trials requiring some exploration and faith to declare TXA the victor. These trials are, at least, remarkably consistent in their mild blessing of TXA, and certainly the effect size is greater than the apparent collection of adverse effects. There are oddities here, as in the others, such as 16% of the trial cohort being lost to follow-up, and the minimal differences in clot lysed at 30 minutes following maximum amplitude – but these are not enough to stay your hand.

The effect size on mortality and neurologic function is almost certainly small, but even large number-needed-to-treats are acceptable for safe, inexpensive drugs for and important, life-altering outcomes. We should be incorporating TXA into various treatment protocols, educated by our best interpretation of the evidence, but mindful it only has a lesser influence in patient outcomes as part of a comprehensive approach to the injured trauma patient.

“Effect of Out-of-Hospital Tranexamic Acid vs Placebo on 6-Month Functional Neurologic Outcomes in Patients With Moderate or Severe Traumatic Brain Injury”
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2770409

Selective vs. Universal Screening for BCVI

Chasing down cerebrovascular injury is a controversial topic. The incidence of injury to carotid or vertebral arteries following blunt trauma is extremely low, with relative rarity varying by practice setting. Because of its general infrequency, many settings utilize the “Memphis” or “Denver” screening criteria to improve the value of imaging.

These authors, however, describe their implementation of a universal screening protocol for BCVI as routine component of their “whole-body” CT for “all major adult blunt trauma activations”. The data set analyzed is a retrospective local trauma registry from their level 1 trauma center, and 4,687 activations fulfilled their inclusion criteria. The overall incidence of BCVI in their population was 2.7%, with about half of those being grade 3 or higher (pseudoaneurysm or worse).

Based on case review of these 126 patients with BCVIs, only 91 (72%) would have met the current American College of Surgeons guidelines for imaging, with a handful additional more picked up by expanded Denver criteria. The authors’ conclusion – universal screening should be considered – ties in a bit with their bias towards whole-body CT, presuming these additional detected injuries represent potential reduced downstream morbidity and mortality.

It should be clear, however, these data have somewhat limited generalizability to most of Emergency Medicine. The individuals with BCVI in their cohort suffered substantial numbers of skull base fractures, cervical spine fractures, traumatic brain injuries, and had in-hospital mortality of 12.7%. Outside the context of major trauma, universal screening for BCVI will be of limited value. For the vast majority of us, continuing to refer to the most recent EAST recommendations for selective screening remains a reasonable practice. In the narrower context of major trauma referrals, these data could inform more expansive screening protocols, while universal screening for all major trauma is still likely one step too far.

“Blunt Cerebrovascular Injury – The Case for Universal Screening”
https://journals.lww.com/jtrauma/Abstract/9000/BLUNT_CEREBROVASCULAR_INJURY___THE_CASE_FOR.97839.aspx

CRASH-3!

Tranexamic acid, an anti-fibrinolytic, helps reduce bleeding. When bleeding can be attenuated, patient-oriented outcomes related to bleeding can be improved. Its effect on outcomes, however, mirrors its clinical effect: quite small. In CRASH-2, general adult trauma with significant extracranial bleeding, the 28-day all-cause mortality reduction was 1.5%. In WOMAN, death due to bleeding from post-partum hemorrhage was reduced 0.4%.

Now, we address the use of TXA for intracranial bleeding. This has been evaluated before, however, in the TICH-2 trial. The primary outcome for TICH-2 was functional status at day 90, which was not reliably different between groups, nor was mortality at 90 days. There were, however, only 2,325 participants in this trial. CRASH-3, on the other hand, has enrolled 12,737.

With nearly six times as many patients, there are likewise about six times as many events – leading to detection of a small difference in head injury-related death, 18.5% in those receiving TXA versus 19.8% receiving placebo. Broken down further, the authors refine source of this difference primarily to those receiving TXA within three hours, and in those with mild and moderate head injury. Beyond three hours and in those with severe head injury, TXA administration was not associated with any reliable benefit (or harm).

However, any enthusiasm for TXA must evaporate when the results are no longer parsed based solely on head injury-related death. All-cause mortality is ultimately no different, with a reported RR of 0·96 (0·89–1·04). It would certainly be preferable if TXA were clearly beneficial, as opposed to observing an excess of non-head injury-related deaths to counterbalance its seeming benefit. Furthermore, looking at their various measures of disability, no clear advantage is seen favoring TXA. The ultimate flavor of their observations are somewhat embittered by these loamy morsels.

What should we do with these results? Well, probably, what we’ll likely do is expand the use of TXA. The good news is this is unlikely to be harmful and TXA is inexpensive. The bad news is, the minimal effect TXA does have on attenuating bleeding simply doesn’t result in a easily measured excess of functional adults post-injury. Practice variation is certainly acceptable surrounding the use of TXA, but we certainly ought not be dogmatic about the necessity of its application in isolated head injury.

“Effects of tranexamic acid on death, disability, vascular occlusive events and other morbidities in patients with acute traumatic brain injury (CRASH-3): a randomised, placebo-controlled trial”

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)32233-0/fulltext

Pediatric C-Spine Injury Risk Factors

It would seem the Pediatric Emergency Care Applied Research Network (PECARN) is gearing up to develop another decision instrument – this time for cervical spine injuries.

This is a prospective, observational study of 4,091 pediatric blunt trauma patients across four pediatric level-1 trauma centers, surveying treating providers about the presence or absence of factors suspected to be implicated with cervical spine injuries. The factors were selected based on previous studies, as well as those suspected as having potential physiologic plausibility and good interrater reliability. The stated purpose – to ultimately develop a decision instrument akin to their prior work for clinically important minor head injury.

Overall, the prevalence of a cervical spine injury – vertebral fractures, ligamentous injury, intraspinal hemorrhage, or spinal cord injury – was 1.8%. The vast majority of patients in their cohort (78.2%) underwent some sort of imaging, although only 15.8% underwent CT. The most predictive items identified are those already typically considered: diving injuries, axial loading injuries, clotheslining, loss of consciousness (including intubation), neck pain, altered mental status (frequently associated with obvious head injuries), limited range of motion, focal neurologic deficits, and substantial torso and thoracic injuries. Of the 74 patients with CSI in their cohort, effectively only one would have been missed by a decision instrument based on these factors – a fall from 10 feet whose symptoms localized to the thoracic spine, and had a C7 burst with T2-T4 compression fractures. Obviously, this was not missed clinically – again revealing the role of clinical judgment outside of any decision instrument.

The most interesting tidbit, leading into the most substantial implications for generalizability, is their note regarding “high-risk MVC”. They comment previous case-control studies determined both predisposing conditions (e.g., congenital abnormalities of the cervical spine) and high-risk MVC were identified as risk factors, whereas in this study they were not. They discuss the low prevalence in their cohort of those with predisposing conditions, and, conversely, the high prevalence of high-risk mechanisms, to justify their lack of multivariate effect on predicting CSI. Even though they did not fall out as predictive elements in this cohort, a future prediction model intended for general use may yet include such features. As such, these data ought not be fully relied upon to downgrade those potential risk factors.

“Cervical Spine Injury Risk Factors in Children With Blunt Trauma”
https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2019/06/18/peds.2018-3221

Again With The Value of CT-Diagnosed Rib Fractures

The elderly are more likely to fall. The elderly who fall are more likely to suffer rib fractures. The elderly who fall and suffer rib fractures are more likely to contract pneumonia and die. The chest x-ray is insensitive for rib fractures. So, we should always perform a CT in the elderly who fall and of whom we have suspicion for rib fractures?

This is a single-center retrospective study of 330 elderly patients, mean age 84, who presented after a fall. Each patient included in the study received a chest XR, followed by a CT of their chest. Overall, 96 patients had a rib fracture – 40 of which were seen on XR, the remainder only on CT. And, there are a number of interesting tidbits they describe in their population:

  • Neither hospital length-of-stay, ICU length-of-stay, or hospital mortality (10.3% vs. 7.3%) were (statistically) increased in those with occult rib fractures compared to those without any rib fractures.
  • These findings held true for the 63 patients with ≥2 occult rib fractures (both XR+ and XR-).
  • In patients with rib fractures seen on XR, the median number of additional rib fractures seen on CT was 2 (range 0-11).

Rates of in-hospital complications were similar between those hospitalized with rib fractures visualized on XR and those visualized only on CT. Then, in their case review, most adverse events occurring in those with occult rib fractures occurred due to associated injuries, events, or iatrogenic causes – not primarily due to the thoracic trauma itself.

This is only a small case series, and it is biased towards higher acuity – considering clinician judgement obtained CT imaging in all cases, and admission rates were nearly 90%. However, it does generally further demonstrate the low value in obtaining CT imaging to ensure no occult rib fractures are missed. An XR has low sensitivity, but these data do not support a premise of increased harm due to missed occult fractures.

“Chest CT imaging utility for radiographically occult rib fractures in elderly fall-injured patients”

https://journals.lww.com/jtrauma/Abstract/publishahead/Chest_CT_imaging_utility_for_radiographically.98414.aspx

How Do Trauma Patients Die?

Comprised of 1,536 patients in an 18-center, prospective, observational study coordinated though the Western Trauma Association:

  • Traumatic brain injury – 45.0%
  • Exsanguination – 23.0%
  • “Late physiologic collapse” – 15.6%
  • “Early physiologic collapse.” – 9.7%
  • Pre-trauma medical event. – 3.8%
  • Airway issue. – 1.5%
  • Sudden unexpected event. – 1.0%

Unpacking the details, there are a handful of anticipated associations. Exanguination patients made up a much larger proportion of penetrating trauma patients. TBI proportion was actually only slightly higher in blunt trauma patients, but penetrating TBI was more likely to be deemed non-survivable on initial presentation. Almost half the deaths in penetrating trauma patients were in the Emergency Department – which also reflects a high proportion of pre-hospital arrest – followed by another quarter in the OR. Blunt trauma patients typically survived admission to the hospital. All patients for whom a pre-trauma medical event was determined to the causative factor were in the blunt trauma cohort, rather than penetrating.

There isn’t anything specifically prescriptive in this descriptive study, but it’s a building block for designing interventions in attempts to address the causes and timeframes of preventable death from trauma.

“The Why & How Our Trauma Patients Die: A Prospective Multi-center Western Trauma Association Study”
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30633095

Don’t Bother With the Parachute!

Most folks erroneously believe a parachute is necessary when jumping from an aircraft. There’s never been evidence to support such a belief in the form of a true randomized-controlled trial. That said, it would be hard to achieve the ethics board approval to perform such a study – and this concept of treatments and medical devices as “parachutes” persists, supposedly obviated from prospective evaluation. The lesson here is a cautionary one, actually, that too many medical practices are inappropriately characterized as parachutes, not so much that parachutes require an RCT.

However, this is precisely what we’ve received for Christmas – an RCT of parachute use for preventing death and major trauma. In this trial, 92 aircraft passengers were screened, and ultimately 23 were randomized to jump from an aircraft wearing either a parachute or an empty backpack. This was an unblinded trial, as well, in which all participants knew whether they were wearing a parachute or an empty backpack at the time of jump. With regard to their primary outcome of death from impact with the ground, there was 0% mortality in the parachute cohort and – wait for it – 0% mortality in the empty backpack cohort.

There were some important differences noted – not between those randomized, but between those screened and those randomized. The altitude of those screened but not randomized was 9,146m, at a velocity of 800 km/h. The altitude of those randomized is best described by the following representative photo:

It should probably be noted zero parachutes were actually deployed by jumpers randomized to that arm.

The lesson here is another fabulous one. The results from clinical trials cannot necessarily be applied to all those included in the eligibility criteria, but can rather be best generalized from those actually receiving the intervention. Insidiously controlling the population undergoing an intervention, among many others, is one of the various tricks those who design clinical trials can use to bias their results, and ultimately mislead.

“Parachute use to prevent death and major trauma when jumping from aircraft: randomized controlled trial”
https://www.bmj.com/content/363/bmj.k5094